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Abstract
This article considers the evidence for threshold e¤ects in the relationship between electricity and emission
permit prices in France and Germany during the second phase of the EU ETS. Specically, we compare linear
and nonlinear threshold models of electricity prices using Hansens (2000) approach of sample splitting and
threshold estimation. We nd evidence of nonlinear threshold e¤ects in both countries. The estimated carbon
price thresholds are 14:94e and 12:57e in France and Germany, respectively. In Germany, the carbon price
does not a¤ect the electricity price below this threshold. In France, the price of emission allowances a¤ects
the cost of electricity generation only below the carbon-price threshold, thus revealing speculative behavior
by French electricity producers on the carbon-allowance market. This is not the case for German electricity
producers.
Résumé
Cet article explore la présence de¤ets de seuil dans la relation liant le prix de lélectricité à celui des
permis démission en France et en Allemagne pendant la seconde phase du SCEQE. Plus précisément, nous
comparons un modèle linéaire de prix de lélectricité avec un modèle non linéaire à seuil en utilisant lapproche
de Hansen (2000). Nous montrons que des e¤ets de seuil sont présents dans les deux pays. Les seuils de prix
du carbone estimés sont de 14:94e et 12:57e en France et en Allemagne, respectivement. En Allemagne,
le prix du carbone na¤ecte pas le prix de lélectricité en dessous de ce seuil. En France, le prix des quotas
démission a¤ecte le prix de lélectricité seulement en-dessous du seuil de prix du carbone, révélant ainsi un
comportement spéculatif des producteurs délectricité français sur le marché du carbone. A linverse, les
producteurs délectricité allemands ne spéculent pas sur le marché des quotas démission.
Keywords: Carbon Emission Trading, Energy prices, Nonlinear threshold model.
JEL classication: C13 C32 C51 Q49 Q58
1 Introduction
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the worlds largest emissions permit market
to date. It concerns mainly energy and the major industrial emitters. It was set up in two phases: Phase
1, from January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2007; and Phase 2 from January 1st, 2008 to December 31st,
2012. Phase 1 is considered as a pilot phase before the introduction of Phase 2, which coincided with the
rst commitment period of the Kyoto protocol. A third phase was agreed in January 2008 which will start
in 2013 and last up to 2020.
Electricity generation is the most polluting activity covered in the EU ETS. As such, we may expect
the price of emission permits to impact on electricity prices. Most articles dealing with the relationship
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between the price of emission allowances and electricity prices have appealed to linear models (OLS, VARs,
VECM, etc.). Sijm et al. (2005, 2006) use OLS to determine the fraction of the carbon price that is reected
in electricity prices in Holland and Germany. Honkatukia et al. (2008) consider the long- and short-run
dynamics of electricity, gas and coal prices and the price of carbon permits in the Finnish market via a VAR
analysis. Bunn and Fezzi (2008) use a vector error correction model with allowances, electricity and gas prices
in the United Kingdom (UK), with daily temperatures in London and seasonal dummies as the exogenous
variables. More recent work has however suggested that the impact of the carbon price on electricity prices is
nonlinear and depends signicantly on the countrys energy mix. Kirat and Ahamada (2011) and Ahamada
and Kirat (2012) consider the impact of carbon trading on electricity prices in France and Germany during
both phases of the EU ETS: 2005-2007 and 2008-2012.1 They rst use a linear model before introducing
nonlinearity via a structural change in the carbon spot price series, which break a¤ects the model parameters.
With the linear modeling of an economic system or relationship, we impose the same model parameters
across di¤erent groups and over time. If the parameters are truly those directly characterizing the economic
relationship in question, a change in the underlying economic relationship from one state to another can be
expressed as a change in the structural parameters of the empirical model. Econometrically, one way to take
into account changes in the structure of parameters is to test for parameter instability in regression and time-
series models. There is a fundamental debate over the presence of nonlinearity due to structural change and
that due to a threshold e¤ect. We can think of the structural change model (changepoint model) as a special
case of the threshold model if we imagine time as the threshold variable. There is a substantial literature
dealing with threshold models (see Hansen, 2011). Among these, Hansen (2000) develops a statistical theory
for threshold estimation in the regression context and asymptotic distribution theory for the regression
estimates.
This article compares a linear model of electricity prices, as in Kirat and Ahamada (2011), to a nonlinear
threshold model using Hansens (2000) approach of sample splitting and threshold estimation. Testing for
threshold e¤ects depending on the price of carbon is of primary importance in the context of electricity-price
models including the carbon price as a regressor. The model that we propose will allow us to see whether
there exists a carbon price at which the behavior of electricity producers changes. We focus on the French and
German electricity markets during the Kyoto commitment period of the EU ETS (2008-2012). The results
below reject the null hypothesis of linearity in favor of the alternative of a nonlinear threshold e¤ect in both
countries. They also reveal speculative behavior by French electricity producers on the carbon market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out Hansens method applied to the electricity-price
1The gure in Appendix A1 shows the quantities of electricity produced in both countries from various primary energy
sources in 2004 and 2009. The share of each of these describes the energy-source mix in electricity generation. While in
Germany more than 50% of electricity is generated using coal and lignite, France produces almost 80% of its electricity from
nuclear energy, with fossil fuels accounting for just 9% to 10%. Moreover, producing electricity from fossil fuel plants is more
costly and emits more CO2 compared to nuclear plants. Consequently, the electricity and carbon price relationships may be
di¤erent in the two countries.
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model in Kirat and Ahamada (2011). Section 3 then presents and discusses the results. Last, Section 4
concludes.
2 The threshold regression model
2.1 Threshold model
The linear model considered by Kirat and Ahamada (2011) is very close to the following:
P elect = 0 + 1P
elec
t 1 + P
gas
t + P
coal
t + P
carbon
t + 1Tt + 2T
2
t +
5X
j=2
 jseasonj + "t (1)
where P yt is the logarithm of the price of commodity y in period t, and T is the temperature variable.
The square of the temperature is included to capture the well-known nonlinear e¤ect of temperature on
electricity prices. The seasonal dummies seasonj , j = 1; ::; 5, correspond to the ve business days of the
week (j =Monday; :::; F riday). This regression can also be written as follows:
P elect = Xt + "t (2)
where  = (0; 1; ; ; 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0. We look for a possible nonlinear e¤ect of carbon price on electricity prices
using the following threshold regression model:
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The threshold parameter p is considered to be unknown. It is convenient to rewrite (3) as follows:
P elect = 
(2)Xt + Xt(p) + "t (4)
where  = (1)   (2), Xt(p) = XtI( P
carbon
t  p) and I(.) is the indicator function. We want to estimate
(1), (2) and p if the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, i.e. H0 :  = 0 in equation (4).
2.2 Nonlinearity Tests and Estimation
We rst examine the null hypothesis of linearity in equation (4), H0 :  = 0. Without an a priori xed
value of p in regression (4), it is not easy to make any statistical inference regarding . In this case p is a
nuisance parameter which is not identied under the null hypothesis. To avoid this problem, Hansen (1996)
developed a simulation technique producing a p-value statistic for the inference of . His approach does
not require xing an a priori value of p and allows for possible heteroskedasticity in (4). The computation
method of the threshold estimate bp uses the concentrated sum of squared errors function from (4):
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S(p) =
TX
t=1

P elect  
d
(2)(p)Xt + b(p)Xt(p)2 (5)
and the threshold estimate bp is the value that minimizes S(p) :
bp = argmin
p 
S(p) (6)
where   is a bounded set of elements of fP carbont ; t = 1; :::; Tg and can be approximated by a grid (see
Hansen, 2000). Finally, the slope estimates in the threshold model (3) can be computed via
d
(2)(bp) and b(bp).
Hansen (2000) also developed asymptotic distribution theory for the threshold estimate bp, and proposed
asymptotic condence intervals by inverting the likelihood-ratio statistic. His approach again allows for
possible heteroskedasticity in (4).
3 Application
3.1 Data
We use electricity prices in e/MWh from the day-ahead base-load2 contracts covering the French and German
markets which are traded on the EPEX spot exchange.3 Day-ahead contracts are traded on a given day
for the delivery of electricity one day ahead. The data we use here are of weekday frequency and run from
March 3rd, 2008 to December 30th, 2010. The carbon spot price comes from the Bluenext environmental
trading exchange expressed in e per ton. With respect to the primary energy markets, we appeal to the
following price series expressed in e per MWh: i) the gas price of the month-ahead future contract traded
on the Zeebrugge hub; and ii) the coal price of the month-ahead future contract Coal CIF ARA. The
temperature information comes from the European Climate Assessment Dataset,4 and is calculated as the
average temperatures recorded at representative regional weather stations. Our nal sample consists of 724
observations.
3.2 Results and comments
We rst check that there is evidence of a threshold e¤ect associated with the emission permit price. We do so
by employing both the F-test to consider a threshold under homoskedastic errors and the heteroskedasticity-
consistent Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for a threshold of Hansen (1996, 2000). The p-values of test-
statistics for the null H0 :  = 0 (conditional on p = bp) are computed using a bootstrap with 10000
replications.
2The electricity base-load price is the price on the block for 24 hours. This is an arithmetic average price over the 24 hours
of the day (from 0h to 23h).
3EPEX Spot exchange is a holding company created by the collaboration between EEX Power Spot and Powernext SA,
respectively the German and French electricity stock exchanges.
4Klein Tank et al., "Daily dataset of 20th-century surface air temperature and precipitation series for the European Climate
Assessment", 2011, available at http://eca.knmi.nl.
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Table 1: Test results of no threshold against the alternative of a threshold
Germany France
Assumption regarding errors Homoskedastic Heteroskedastic Homoskedastic Heteroskedastic
Test for no threshold 31.161 25.309 32.269 27.776
(0.039) (0.046) (0.027) (0.017)
Note: The bootstrapped p-values computed with 10000 replications are in (); The F-test and LM-test are
used to test for no threshold under the assumption of homoskedastic and heteroskedastic errors, respectively.
Table (1) and Figures (1) and (2) show the results of these tests of no threshold against the alternative
of a threshold e¤ect in both Germany and France. These results strongly reject the null hypothesis of no
threshold in favor of the alternative of a threshold at the 95% condence level in both countries. Figures (1)
and (2) plot the F-test statistic as a function of the threshold in the carbon-allowance price in Germany and
France, respectively. The dotted lines in the graphs represent the critical values at the standard signicance
level of 95%. The null hypothesis of linearity is rejected in favor of the alternative of a threshold e¤ect in
both countries. Linearity is rejected if the F-test statistic exceeds the critical value. Since the F-test is
valid only with homoskedastic errors, it needs to be complemented by an LM test, as in Table (1). We thus
consider the threshold-test results which are indicated by the results from the homoskedasticity tests which
are shown in the last row of Table (2). Specically, the relevant threshold tests are the F-test in Germany
and the LM-test in France, since we do not reject homoskedasticity in the residuals of the threshold model
in Germany but we do so for France.
Figures (3) and (4) show the graphs of the normalized likelihood-ratio statistic as a function of the
threshold in the carbon-allowance price (in logs) in Germany and France, respectively. The estimates of the
carbon thresholds (in logs) are the values that minimize these graphs, which occur at 2:531 (12:57 e/ton)
and 2:704 (14:94 e/ton) in Germany and France, respectively. The dotted lines in the graphs represent
the 95% critical values, so we can read o¤ the asymptotic 95% condence intervals from the graphs where
the normalized likelihood-ratio sequence crosses the dotted lines. These condence intervals (in logs) are
[2:5257; 2:5313] in Germany and [2:6925; 2:7555] in France. The corresponding 95% condence intervals in
e/ton are [12:50; 12:58] and [14:77; 15:73], respectively. These results show that there is a reasonable evidence
for a two-regime specication in both countries. Figures (3) and (4) show that the condence intervals are
fairly tight, so the uncertainty over the values of these thresholds is correspondingly small.
Table (2) present the estimation results of the threshold model of electricity prices in Germany and France.
This table also contains the estimation results results from the corresponding linear models in columns (2)
and (5), and underlines the irrelevance of inference when nonlinearity is not taken into account. Row (3)
shows the estimated threshold bp and its 95% condence interval. The estimated carbon price thresholds
are 12:57 and 14:94 e/ton in Germany and France, respectively. These thresholds are signicantly di¤erent
6
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Figure 1: Test for linearity against nonlinearity in Germany
Figure 2: Test for linearity against nonlinearity in France
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Figure 3: Germany: Condence interval construction for the threshold (in logs)
Figure 4: France: Condence interval construction for the threshold (in logs)
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Table 2: Estimation Results
Country Germany France
Linearity Nonlinearity Linearity Nonlinearity
Threshold (bp) 12.57e [12.50 ; 12.58] 14.94e [14.77 ; 15.73]
Regime Below threshold Above threshold Below threshold Above threshold
P elect 1 0.575*** 0.218 0.607*** 0.730*** 0.641*** 0.794***
(0.072) (0.166) (0.052) (0.043) (0.044) (0.076)
P
gas
t 0.215*** 0.707*** 0.174*** 0.113*** 0.205*** 0.045
(0.050) (0.178) (0.045) (0.042) (0.039) (0.075)
P coalt -0.031 -0.780* -0.031 -0.033 -0.197*** 0.088
(0.048) (0.406) (0.049) (0.045) (0.051) (0.064)
P carbont 0.190*** -0.325 0.224*** 0.182*** 0.245*** 0.048
(0.046) (0.250) (0.055) (0.042) (0.053) (0.063)
T level -0.006*** -0.025** -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.005
(0.001) (0.0098) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
(T
level
)
2
0.0002*** 0.0024* 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.0011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.767*** 3.429*** 0.671*** 0.597*** 0.889*** 0.603***
(0.120) (0.920) (0.080) (0.073) (0.151) (0.144)
season2 -0.135*** -0.036 -0.144*** 0.168*** -0.134*** -0.201***
(0.019) (0.040) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.028)
season3 -0.138*** -0.040 -0.147*** 0.167*** -0.131*** -0.200***
(0.020) (0.043) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029)
season4 -0.184*** -0.154 -0.184*** 0.195*** -0.166*** -0.219***
(0.025) (0.124) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027)
season5 -0.314*** -0.182*** -0.323*** 0.314*** -0.277*** -0.353***
(0.020) (0.046) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.026)
R2 0.8128 0.4854 0.8475 0.8808 0.8316 0.8554
Joint R2 0.8225 0.8859
Homoskedast-
icity (p-value)
0.014 0.069 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors are in () ; values in [.] represent the 95% condence interval of the estimated threshold
; *, ** and *** refer respectively to the 10%, 5% and 1% signicance levels. The Joint R-squared is calculated
from the residuals of model (4).
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from each other. Neither of theme appear in the 95% condence interval of the other price threshold.
A detailed analysis of the results in Table (2) highlights the speculative behavior of French electricity
producers on the emissions permit market. Speculation, as dened by David Newbery,5 is the purchase (or
temporary sale) of goods for later resale (repurchase), rather than use, in the hope of proting from the
intervening price changes. When the price of emission permits is low (below the threshold of 14:94 e/ton),
French electricity producers expect it to rise. They buy permits in order to speculate and hedge the carbon
risk-market by including the price of carbon allowance in their electricity-generation cost function: a rise of
1% in the emission-permit price results in 0:24% higher French day-ahead electricity prices. Hedging here is
undertaken to reduce the risks arising from risky speculative activity. When the carbon spot price exceeds
the threshold, it is no longer included in the cost function of electricity generation. At that time, French
electricity producers sell their permits and take their prots.
The behavior of German electricity producers is the opposite of their French counterparts and does not
reveal any speculative conduct. When the emission-permit price is low (below the threshold of 12:57 e/ton),
German electricity producers do not include the price of emission permits in their production cost function.
When the carbon price exceeds the threshold, it is a determinant of German electricity prices: 1% higher
carbon prices result in 0:22% higher day-ahead electricity prices.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the relationship between electricity prices and the prices of both the primary
energies used in electricity generation and carbon dioxide emission permits in both France and Germany, us-
ing a nonlinear threshold model. The results reveal heterogeneity in the response of the electricity-generation
sector to carbon constraints. French electricity producers behave speculatively, while their German coun-
terparts do not. This behavior reects the composition of the French energy mix. The predominance of
non-fossil energy sources in France means that there is less need to use emission permits, and so greater
opportunity for speculation in the market for emission allowances.
5See the article on "Futures markets, hedging and speculation" in "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics".
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A APPENDICES
A.1 Energy mixes in France and Germany
The French and German energy mix in 2004 & 2009 (source: IEA)
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